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I. INTRODUCTION
The tension between the desires of managers of a corporation to max-
imize corporate "returns" in the manner they see fit and the desires of
minority (i.e. non-controlling) shareholders to obtain the best possible
return on their investment has been a continuing theme in the evolution
of the corporate law. This tension is part of a larger paradox in the
relationship between the corporate investor and the corporate manager.
This paradox arises because the interests of the investor and the manager
are not identical: The manager is left with the "duty" to increase investor
wealth and the desire to increase his own.
* B.A. University of Virginia, J.D. Wake Forest University, L.L.M. (Tax) South-
ern Methodist University, Candidate L.L.M. (Corporate) New York University.
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This paradox was recognized by an early commentator who stated:
The separation of ownership from control produces a condition
where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may,
and often do, diverge, and where many of the checks which
formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear. Size
alone tends to give these giant corporations a social significance
not attached to smaller units of private enterprise. By the use
of the open market for securities, each of these corporations
assumes obligations towards the investing public which trans-
form it from a legal method clothing the rule of a few individ-
uals into an institution at least nominally serving investors
who have embarked funds in its enterprise. New responsibil-
ities towards the owners, the workers, the consumers, and the
State thus rest upon the shoulders of those in control.'
The following article will address the issue of the extent to which
minority shareholders should be recognized to have a legal right which
reflects the responsibilities of the management to the shareholders as a
group.2 It will then address the issue of whether the imposition of "fi-
duciary duties" as traditionally defined furthers the goal of protecting
minority shareholders.2 It concludes that while minority shareholders
need more protection than the corporate structure (absent the imposition
of extrinsic duties) can give them, the imposition of "fiduciary duties" is
not a proper response.
In order to explore these issues, the article will analyze the behavior
of the controlling shareholder(s) in a close corporation; it will then analyze
the behavior which the minority shareholder(s) would try to impose upon
the controlling corporation; these behaviors will then be compared in
terms of economic efficiency; finally the economic efficiency of allowing
minority shareholders an enforceable right to change corporate policy
will be discussed.
II. THE ACTIVITY OF THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
Controversies between minority shareholders and controlling share-
holders can be placed into two categories. The first type of controversy
arises when the minority shareholders do not believe that the controlling
I A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6
(1935). But see Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle
and Means Reconsidered, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 388 (1977) which argues that the
increased pace of information flow and market reaction has mitigated the problem
that Berle and Means described.
2 In Cox, Reflections on Ex Ante Compensation and Diversification of Risk as
Fairness Justifications for Limiting Fiduciary Obligations of Corporate Officers,
Directors, and Controlling Shareholders, 60 TEMP. L. Q. 47 (1987), the author
concluded that market forces would mitigate the necessity for the imposition of
such rights and responsibilities.
See DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988
DUKE L. J. 879 (1988).
[Vol. 38:4
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol38/iss4/5
FIDUCIAR Y RESPONSIBILITIES
shareholders are capable of maximizing the total return to the corpora-
tion. This type of controversy could manifest itself in the minority share-
holders' attempt to force the corporation to pursue a certain course of
action which the minority shareholder deems advantageous. This type of
controversy has not proven susceptible to remedy by the courts. The courts
generally will not substitute their business judgment for that of the di-
rectors and the managers.
4
The second type of controversy arises when the minority shareholders
claim that the controlling shareholders are not primarily attempting to
maximize corporate returns, but are attempting primarily to maximize
returns to the controlling shareholders. This activity may or may not
involve also trying to maximize total corporate returns.
Maximization of returns to the controlling shareholders can be at-
tempted through the use of "amenities. '5 "Amenities" are defined as those
attributes of a corporation which allow a manager to withdraw value
without declaring a dividend.6 An "amenity" can be as innocuous as free
executive travel or as crucial as the publicity that results from owning
a sports franchise.'
The minority shareholders object to the maximizing of the corporate
"amenities" to the detriment of present or future dividends. The minority
shareholders therefore contend that management has breached its fidu-
ciary relationship to the corporation. 8 This contention brings us to the
crux of the issue: Which "persons" are entitled to enforce the fiduciary
duty owed to the corporation by the managers of the corporation? This
issue is critical because the "corporation" itself is a legal fiction reflecting
the legal rights and obligations of some of the parties with an interest
in the corporation. 9
In order to test the economic efficiency of management's decision to
maximize the returns to the controlling shareholders, we will make the
following assumptions:
4See generally Lewis, The Business Judgment Rule and Corporate Directors'
Liability for Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 157 (1970). But see Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) in which the court determined that the
corporate managers acted in an uninformed manner and were not entitled to the
presumption of care accorded by the business judgment rule. Smith v. Van Gork-
ham, it should be noted, did not involve the issue of whether a minority share-
holder would be able to sue for the same abuse.
5 Demsetz & Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Con-
sequences, 93 J. OF POL. ECON. 1155, 1161 (1985).
6Id.7 1d.
In Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343,
348-349 (1985), the court stated: "The managers of course, must exercise the
privilege in a manner consistent with their fiduciary duty to act in the best
interests of the corporation and not of themselves as individuals" (quoting Dodge
v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919)).
9 "A corporation is an ideal body, subsisting only in the contemplation of the
law, which may be comprised of members constantly changing." Pratt v. Bacon,
27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 123, 125-26 (1830).
1990]
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1. That the management's decision to maximize the controlling share-
holders' return does not affect the overall economic return of the
corporation, but merely transfers some of the returns from the mi-
nority shareholders to the controlling ones.
2. That the management's decision to maximize the controlling share-
holders' return also maximizes the overall return to the corporation,
but the controlling shareholders benefit disproportionately from the
gain.
3. That the management's decision to maximize the controlling share-
holder's return has a negative impact upon the corporation's total
return. It not only works to transfer some of the gain from the
minority shareholders to the controlling shareholders, it also works
to lower the overall return.
A. Cases in Which the Management's Decision to Maximize Return
to the Controlling Shareholders has no Apparent Affect on Total
Corporate Return
Often, controlling shareholders will attempt to withdraw value from a
corporation in a manner which does not lower the total returns from the
corporation, but which shifts returns from minority shareholders to con-
trolling shareholders. The most obvious example of this type of behavior
is the misdirection, or theft, of corporate funds. Although controlling
shareholders rarely actually "steal" corporate funds, arguably behavior
that is similar morally is the granting of larger salaries to insiders in
lieu of larger corporate dividends, when it is clear that the larger salaries
are not justified in an arm's length transaction.10
The misdirection, or theft, scenario presents a compelling argument for
the imposition of some form of minority shareholder protection. While it
could be, and has been, argued that shareholders take the risk of economic
setback into account when they invest in corporations,11 this argument
is more attractive when the subject is management "shirking" rather
than management "theft".12 When theft is involved, the minority share-
holders' right to relief seems almost irrebuttable.
10 See Aronson v. Lewis, 466 A.2d 375 (Del. Ch. 1983), rev'd, 473 A.2d 805 (Del.
1984).
" Cox, supra note 2.
12 Id. at 59. In part this distinction stems from the fact that the fiduciary'sduty, when imposed, is not absolute. The fiduciary does not act as the guarantor
of the investment, but only agrees to use reasonable care in his management.
Harvard College v. Armory, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 446 (1830). See Shattuck, The De-
velopment of the Prudent Man Rule for Fiduciary Investment in the United States
in the Twentieth Century, 12 OHIO ST. L. J. 491 (1951).
[Vol. 38:4
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol38/iss4/5
FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES
A complex system has been developed to vindicate the minority share-
holders' claim in this type of situation. 3 In short the following steps are
taken: 1) The dissenting shareholder must request that the corporation
take steps to vindicate the rights of the corporation; 2) if the corporation
does not act within a reasonable time, the dissenting shareholder may
file suit against the directors and any other offending parties; 3) the
corporation may appoint an independent board to weigh the plaintiffs'
claims; 4) if the independent board decides that there is no merit to the
plaintiffs' claims, it will seek to dismiss the plaintiffs' suit; 5) if the court
determines that the independent board set up by the corporation is truly
not independent or did not fairly consider the claims of the plaintiffs, the
court will at that time litigate the merits of the plaintiffs' claims. 14
The claim can be very expensive to litigate.'- There is no guarantee
that the suit has been filed in good faith; and because the question of
whether the board and management have violated their fiduciary rela-
tionships to the corporation is fact-intensive, the findings of fact will often
be extensive and expensive to present to the court. 16
The expense of the litigation not only extends to the plaintiffs and the
defendant corporation; the time spent in court places a burden upon tax-
payers in general. This ability to go to court to enforce the rights of the
corporation is in marked contrast to other holders of interests in the
corporation, who have no such right.'7 Other holders of corporate interests
may be protected by the "morals of the marketplace" rather than by any
fiduciary responsibility running to them. 8
The potential for abuse of the positions of corporate management is
high. When corporate management is an alter ego of the controlling
shareholders, the potential for abuse is increased markedly. The "trans-
fer" of wealth from the minority shareholders to the controlling share-
holders can make the interests of the minority shareholders almost
worthless. Under these circumstances, the issue is not whether the share-
holder has been harmed, but whether he has sustained what should be
recognized as a legally cognizable harm.
11 Technically, the minority shareholders are vindicating the claim of the cor-
poration as a whole. The corporation and not the complaining shareholder receives
the benefit of any recovery. Because, however, the corporation is a legal fiction
reflecting the rights and duties of the various parties involved in the corporation,
and because the controlling shareholders are losing value and the minority share-
holders are gaining it, claims of the minority shareholders are in fact being
vindicated, regardless of the legal niceties.
There are still situations in which the minority shareholder can seek relief on
his own behalf rather than that of the corporation. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
14 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). See also Youngman
v. Tahmoud, 457 A.2d 376 (Del. Ch. 1983).
1" See Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501 (Del. Ch. 1984), affd 499 A.2d 1184 (Del.
1985).
16 Id.
17 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504,
1524 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (the court would not impute a fiduciary obligation upon the
management of a corporation towards bondholders absent a specific agreement).
Is Id. at 1525.
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B. Cases in Which the Management's Decision to Maximize the
Controlling Shareholders' Return also has the Effect of
Maximizing the Total Return to the Corporation
It has been theorized that the tendency of the controlling shareholders
to take advantage of corporate "amenities" tends to maximize ownership
utility, if not ownership profit.19 It has been further theorized that a large
shareholder is profit-maximizing to a firm because he has the initiative
to do the necessary research to discover firm value-increasing improve-
ments.20 Another possible source of wealth-maximizing selfish behavior
on the part of corporate insiders is when the attributes of the corporation
and the attributes of the corporate insiders produce a synergistic effect.
When the attributes of the corporation are combined with the attributes
of the corporate insiders the total is greater than the sum of the parts:
One plus one is equal to three.2'
An example of this type of combination is a sports franchise controlled
by a television station,22 or a sports franchise controlled by the manu-
facturer of a commodity.23 The "free" use of the sports franchise for tel-
evision or the "free" advertising and publicity which the commodity
receives might be worth more to the controlling shareholder than the
franchise would be worth operating in an arm's-length manner.
In practice, it would be unusual to find a case where this synergistic
effect could be proven with any certainty. The closest example would be
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.2 4 In Dodge, the controlling shareholder attempted
to maximize the returns from a closely-held corporation by producing
many cars at an inexpensive price. This strategy required the shareholder
to retain large amounts of cash in the corporation. 25 The controlling share-
holder received an amenity by: 1) Being able to perform charitable acts;
and 2) being able to manage a larger corporation. The returns were max-
imized because almost surely the money would be more efficient in the
hands of Ford Motor Co. than in the hands of the shareholders.
These amenities were purchased in part by the involuntary contribu-
tions of the minority shareholders. Even though the controlling share-
holder used his management position to maximize corporate profits, the
result of these transactions was to lower the return on the minority
shareholders' shares. The issue to be addressed later is the extent to which
courts should take into consideration the fact that the synergistic effect
of the transaction results in a net increase in societal assets.
" Demsetz & Lehn, supra note 5, at 1161.
2o Shleifer & Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control 94 J. OF POL.
ECON. 461, 465 (1986).
21 The term "synergism" is borrowed from the patent law. It describes the
situation where two or more obvious objects are combined in a nonobvious way
with unforeseeable results. Fenton, Combination Patents and Synergism: Must 2
+ 2 = 5?, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1206 (1980).
22 For instance, WTBS and the Atlanta Hawks and the Atlanta Braves.
- For instance, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. and the Saint Louis Cardinals.
204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
170 N.W. at 682.
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C. Cases in Which the Management's Decision to Maximize the
Returns to the Controlling Shareholder Results in Lower
Returns to the Corporation as a Whole
The third type of transaction which the controlling shareholders could
enter into in order to maximize their returns are transactions which fail
to maximize corporate returns but by their nature increase the amenities
to the controlling shareholders. An example of this type of transaction is
the granting of "perks" to the officers of the corporation.
The granting of perks fails to maximize corporate returns because man-
agement might, absent the constraints of the corporate and tax laws,
prefer cash to non-pecuniary awards. It is the structure of the organization
or the effects of the tax laws, which in many cases makes the awarding
and receipt of non-pecuniary awards attractive. Only in relatively rare
circumstances does the provision of non-pecuniary benefits by the cor-
poration have positive economic utility aside from these legally created
distortions.
26
Judicial review of these types of transactions is difficult because the
extent to which the perks represent a distribution of assets to manage-
ment and the extent to which the perks represent a benefit to the cor-
poration is difficult to ascertain. Although this type of transaction is
clearly a form of self-dealing and the business judgment standard might
not apply,27 the courts are reluctant to lightly dismiss the claims of man-
agement which was responsible for the decision.28 The extent to which
this failure to maximize returns represents a major factor in corporate
decisions is discussed infra.
26 These circumstances include structures which give rise to economies of scale
that the corporation can invoke, which its employees cannot (i.e. group health
insurance). They might also include circumstances in which the corporation de-
sires to direct its employees' expenditures (i.e. exercise club memberships), where
the expenditures at least arguably benefit both the employer and the employee.
27 New York Trust Co. v. American Realty Co., 244 N.Y. 209, 155 N.E. 102
(1926).
2' Although the standard under which the managers' activities are judged is
different in the case of self-dealing than the standard in the usual case, the
intricate fact issues remain. The court must determine the consequences of the
deal and the facts as they were presented to management at the time the deal
was consummated. The court (and the minority shareholder) is disadvantaged in
that it can only judge the transaction retrospectively while the manager couldjudge the transaction prospectively.
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the corporate manager is best able
to determine whether impermissible self-dealing has occurred. The issue facing
the court is whether the manager is willing to honestly make this determination.
Under these circumstances the courts are understandably unwilling, to in effect,
accuse the manager of being untruthful.
1990]
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III. THE BEHAVIOR WHICH THE MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS SEEK TO IMPOSE
The behavior that the minority shareholders would seek to impose upon
the closely-held corporation is that the closely-held corporation act like
a publicly-held corporation. The attributes would include:
1. That the corporation seek to maximize "profits" to the greatest ex-
tent possible.
2. That the corporation and the corporation's management/controlling
shareholders act at arm's length as though they were unrelated
parties.
3. To the extent that there are profits arising from the operation of the
corporation, these profits should be distributed to the shareholders
in the form of dividends.
To early commentators, these attributes were apparently inseparable
from the concept of the corporation.29 Because the form of the corporation
was dictated by the state of incorporation as consideration for the privilege
of doing business, 30 and not created as a result of bargaining between the
parties to the venture, the issue of whether deviations from this form
would be efficient did not arise. The courts were not interested in max-
imizing corporate returns, they were interested in determining the scope
of the corporate charter granted by the state.
Proponents have attempted to justify the imposition of a duty to mi-
nority shareholders by noting that this duty reflects the parties' expec-
tations; this duty would have been made express if the parties had con-
tracted completely.3 1 This assumption about the parties' expectations is
not entirely convincing: The consequences of being a minority shareholder
in a closely held corporation can be so disastrous that rather than seek
to mitigate the effects contractually, the investor would avoid the
investment 32 or rely upon the character of the board of directors. Under
this view, the risk of being a minority shareholder in a controlled cor-
poration is an economic risk that is borne by the investor like any other
economic risk.3  The purchase price of the shares reflects any perception
' Cf. Note, The Effect of Depreciation, Depletion, and Appreciation of Assets
on the Payment of Dividends, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 236 (1928) ("[tlhere are but
two logical points for the stockholders to reap their benefit: (i) When the appre-
ciation accrues; (ii) On dissolution.").
Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 328 Ill. 321, 159 N.E. 250, 253 (1927) ("A cor-
poration is an artificial body composed of individuals who own its capital stock
and whose rights and liabilities are fixed by statute.") (Emphasis added).
" Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment
on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1989).
31 I.e., by refusing to buy shares in corporations where the likelihood appears
high that the corporation would go private.
I Cox, supra note 2, at 51:
[tihe neoclassical model perceives the shareholder as an investor in a di-
versified portfolio of securities whose interest in and relationship to any
particular firm in the portfolio is extremely tenuous. Shareholder utility is
a function of the wealth generated for the investor by the investor's portfolio.
It is independent of conduct or events affecting any particular firm, except
to the extent that the conduct or the events affect the portfolio's value.
[Vol. 38:4
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of risk that the contingency may occur. The parties do not attempt to
mitigate or allocate the risk because of the practical impossibility of doing
so. 4 As explained earlier, it is nearly impossible in many instances to
separate bona fide corporate transactions from the forbidden transfer of
amenities.
The attempt to gauge the intentions of the parties, had they considered
the problem of the role of the minority shareholder in the closely held
corporation, is inconclusive. Even if the intentions were clear, it is not
apparent that they should be controlling. The imposition of rights and
duties has ramifications beyond the contract between the shareholder and
the corporation. In order to determine whether the imposition of rights
and duties would be justified, one must look at the content of the rights
and duties and their economic consequences. The next section of this
article will discuss the fiduciary duties applied and why they are appro-
priate or not for the corporate area.
IV. THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF THE IMPOSITION OF FIDUCIARY
RESPONSIBILITIES FROM THE CORPORATION TO MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
It is unclear whether the rule allowing minority shareholders to main-
tain actions against corporate managers is a default rule, a strong default
rule, or an immutable rule.3 5 A law is a "default rule" if it operates only
in the absence of express agreement of the parties. A law is a "strong
default rule" if the parties can change the rule only through a clear and
unambiguous manifestation of intent to do so. A law is an immutable
rule if the parties can not avoid the rule through express agreement.
36
The issue, reduced to its simplest terms, is whether a corporation could
be organized with a provision disallowing the right of a minority share-
holder to maintain a derivative action and whether this provision would
be enforced because it is not inconsistent with public policy.
3 7
3' A legislative reaction to this problem is to allow shareholders to force dis-
solution of closely held corporations, regardless of whether the board of directors
or management has acted in an improper manner. See, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. § 355
(1953). The problem then becomes: What constitutes a closely held corporation
for this purpose?
For a more detailed discussion of these different types of laws, see Ayres &
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87 (1989).
36 Id.
17 The provision might be against public policy because it leaves the share-
holder with a right (the right to a dividend equal to that of other shareholders),
but no remedy. In Penington v. Commonwealth Hotel Constr. Co., 17 Del. Ch.
394, 155 A. 514, 517 (1931), the court defined "dividend" as "a sum of money or
portion of a divisible thing to be distributed according to some fixed scheme." The
diversion of corporate funds in the form of amenities violates this "fixed scheme"
requirement.
In Ellingwood v. Wolfs Head Oil Refining Co., 27 Del. Ch. 356, 38 A.2d 743
(1944) the court held that articles of incorporation contrary to public policy would
not be enforced.
1990]
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The determination of which type of law encompasses the imposition of
the fiduciary responsibility is important because that will effect the law's
economic significance. If the circumstances are such that the law will be
imposed, the law will have identical consequences regardless of its un-
derlying nature. If, however, the law is merely a default rule, the economic
effect can be changed and even eliminated through the bargaining proc-
ess.
The economic effect of the imposition of fiduciary responsibility can be
felt in several areas: 1) It may facilitate the sale of stock in the market-
place because the legal rights of minority shareholders in controlled cor-
porations will be uniform; 2) it may induce the sale of stock in the
marketplace because prospective non-controlling shareholders value the
protection that it gives; 3) it may reduce the disparity in value between
large blocks of stock owned by the same person and small blocks with
diffuse ownership; 4) it may force management to fail to maximize eco-
nomic benefits because of fear of a derivative suit; and 5) it may impose
costs on the public at large to litigate minority shareholder claims. The
following sections of this article will focus upon these possible economic
effects.
A. The Facilitation of the Sale of Stock in the Marketplace
The imposition of a fixed fiduciary duty on the part of the corporation
to individual shareholders and the delineation of a fixed manner of en-
forcing that right provides stability in financial markets. The transaction
costs of trying to determine the effect of particular provisions upon the
investor's potential returns are avoided.38 In this sense, the imposition of
a certain rule is an important event independent of the content of the
rule.39
This imposition of a uniform rule has a temporal as well as a geograph-
ical function. Prospective shareholders are not only concerned with the
transaction costs of determining the impact of present non-conforming
articles of incorporation on their possible returns; they are also concerned
about the possibility that non-conforming rules that might have a neg-
ative impact will be imposed in the future. In order to quantify the future
possibility of negative amendments to the articles of incorporation, the
prospective shareholder will have to gauge the honesty and ability of the
board of directors 40 and other shareholders. Because of the myriad factors
35 See Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1549, 1567 (1989). In this article, the author advances the thesis that non-uniform
corporate articles impose costs on both investors and on other corporations. They
do this by increasing the perceived risks associated with investing in corporations
whose articles might contain terms potentially harmful to the shareholders' re-
turns.
39 There is a constant tension in the law between applying a rigid rule in every
case and providing just relief in the case at hand. Shauer, Formalism, 91 YALE
L. J. 509, 537 (1988). The application of rigid rules might be more important in
the corporate law where large numbers of transactions are essential than in other
areas of the law.
10 The Securities Exchange Commission has promulgated regulations requiring
companies which register stocks to disclose legal activities taken against insiders
which might reflect on their honesty. The regulations also require the companies
to disclose the insiders' business experience. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401(e) and (f).
[Vol. 38:4
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involved, these determinations are clearly more difficult than determin-
ing the impact of a uniform law.
If the policies which favor the application of a uniform rule are deter-
mined to be important, the choosing of the uniform rule will be corre-
spondingly more important. While the determination of whether a
uniform rule is needed is to some degree independent of what the rule
should be, to some degree the determinations are interdependent. A case
can be made that a "default rule '41 should tend to benefit those parties
with the least ability to avoid its application. 42 If, on the other hand, a
rule is "immutable" (i.e. uniform) there should be greater pressures for
the rule to achieve efficient results when applied. The next sections of
this article will explore this "efficiency" issue in greater depth.
B. Inducing the Sale of Stock in the Marketplace
The imposition of a duty on the part of the corporation to individual
shareholders may aid the sale of stock in the marketplace because pro-
spective shareholders might be reluctant to buy stocks without the pro-
tection that the imposition provides. Absent the imposition of a duty, the
prospective shareholders may be purchasing a "right" that has little legal
significance in the traditional concept of the word.43 This lack of legal
protection might deter the small investor from investing in equity stocks
and force them into investments where the legal protections are more
traditional.
If the removal of the "protections" granted to minority shareholders at
this time44 were to prevent small investors from investing in equity stocks,
the economic effects would probably be very significant. It is perhaps the
fear of these possible adverse economic effects which have led the courts
to impose this duty of fiduciary responsibility.
Upon reading investment literature, it appears that investors place
little confidence in the ability of the courts to enforce the fiduciary re-
sponsibility of the corporation. Typical of the comments is: "The minority
stockholder has little power to stop or change company procedures unless
41 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 34.
42 Under the same rationale, contracts are construed against the parties who
construct them.
" This view of stock ownership apparently violates the common law maxim,
"every right has a remedy." Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 953, 92 Eng. Rep.
126, 136 (1703). This apparent violation is reconciled if one accepts the fact that
shareholders are not protected by contractual obligation, but through their power
to elect the board of directors. See Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE
L. J. 1197, 1210 (1983). A recurring theme in corporate law is the attempt to
reconcile the rights created by the corporation with those created by the trust
and the contract. It is not clear whether this reconciliation is proper or desirable.
These include the right to sue derivatively and the right to sue for breach
of fiduciary duty.
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the majority stockholders make a major management error."45 This theme
has been repeated endlessly and the market value of minority share-
holdings reflects this perception of the plight of minority shareholders.46
While it might be argued that investors have already discounted the
"security" given to them by the right to sue and the right to sue deriv-
atively, generalizations of this type are of uncertain utility. The elimi-
nation of these rights would in some degree affect the risk and uncertainty
attached to stock ownership. To a large extent, the science of investment
is the science of risk management. 47 The reaction of capital markets to
even a small change in perceived risk is difficult to predict.
4 8
The difficulty with the imposition of a workable fiduciary duty is the
articulation of a standard under which compliance with the duty will be
measured. There are two values competing in this area. First, the cor-
poration's insiders must have the ability to carry out their task with
relatively unfettered discretion.49 Second, the interests of the outsiders
must be protected from overreaching on the part of insiders.50
The imposition of a fiduciary duty running from majority shareholders,
directors, and managers to minority shareholders might be perceived to
have some value because it limits the ability of corporate insiders to
engage in egregious acts of corporate waste. 61 This perceived value may
aid the sale of stock in the marketplace. It appears that the fiduciary
duty, to the extent that it exists, is not highly valued within the param-
eters of actual corporate transactions. Because the duty is not highly
valued, it is doubtful that it plays a major role in aiding the sale of stocks.
45 Trieschman, Leverett, & Shedd, Valuating Common Stock for Minority Stock
and ESOPs in Closely Held Corporations, 31 Bus. HORIZONs Feb. 1988, at 63, 66.
Along the same lines is Snyder, The Woes of Investors in Private Corporations,
FORTUNE, (Aug. 14, 1978, at 189) ("Often there is a tendency among the majority
shareholders to regard the company's assets as belonging to the family rather
than to the shareholders.") (quoting F. Hodge O'Neal, Madill Prof. of Law at
Wash. Univ.).
See Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, Management Ownership and Market Val-
uation 20 J. OF FIN. EcON. 293 (1988); DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Rice, Going Private:
Minority Freezeouts and Shareholder Wealth, 27 J. OF L. AND EcoN. 367 (1984).
47 See Collins, Ledolfer, & Rayburn, Some Further Evidence on the Stochastic
Properties of Systemic Risk, 60 J. OF Bus. 425 (1987), and sources therein cited.
See also Wagner, The Many Dimensions of Risk, 14 J. OF PORTFOLIO MGMT. Winter
1988, at 35.
48 The extent to which investors attempt to avoid and quantify risk is reflected
in the popularity of J. GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987) and its
application to investments in general and the stock markets in particular. This
book tried to find fundamental patterns in even purportedly "random" events.
49 As stated by a court, "I think the matter lies so appropriately in the field of
management, that a shareholder has no right to the aid of a court of equity to
assist him in overcoming the judgment of the directors." Mercantile Trading Co.
v. Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 325, 154 A. 457, 461 (1931).
50 See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
51 These egregious acts are to some extent accepted practices which are taken
to illegal extremes. See Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARv. L.
REV. 1630 (1961).
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If the imposition of a fiduciary duty running from controlling share-
holders, directors, and managers to minority shareholders is helping to
induce the sale of stock in the marketplace, it is possible that small
investors are being systematically misled about the scope of protections
that the duty offers. Shareholders have been the major beneficiaries of
the corporate takeovers as structured in the past.5 2 Would the fiduciary
standards for corporate insiders protect minority shareholders from trans-
actions which lower the value of their interest? It seems unlikely that it
would give them any true protection.
C. The Reduction in the Disparity in Value Between Shares Held
by Large Shareholders and those Held by Small Shareholders
To some extent, the imposition of a duty might act as a mechanism to
equalize the value of shares owned by large shareholders and those owned
by small shareholders. This result could be derived from the minimization
of any quasi-control premium: The benefits to be derived from controlling
the corporation would be lowered in comparison to the benefits to be
derived from being a passive owner. This stressing of the benefits of
passive ownership of stock at the expense of the benefits of operating the
corporation would have two primary results: 1) The "efficiency" of the
market would be enhanced; and 2) small shareholders could more easily
participate in equity ownership.
The extent to which financial markets are "efficient" and the extent to
which movements in financial markets represent a "random walk" have
been debated for decades. 53 Studies have implied that these markets are
not absolutely efficient: Intrinsic factors, such as disparities in access to
information between the parties, can cause the markets to behave inef-
ficiently.54 The degree to which these deviations from the efficient market
hypothesis can be viewed as aberrations or as part of an overall pattern
is debatable or perhaps merely a matter of semantics.
Regardless of whether the market reacts with precise efficiency, it be-
haves efficiently enough that many investors proceed as if the market
were efficient. 55 This efficiency is the basis upon which small, unsophis-
52 See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (the owner of a debt interest in a corporation contended that the
corporate transaction worked a transfer of value from the debt holders to the
equity holders).
13 Forma, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work
25 J. FINANCE 383 (1970).
14 Sanger & McConnell, Stock Exchange Listings, Firm Value, and Security
Market Efficiency: The Impact of NASDAQ, 21 J. Fin. and Quantitative Anal. 1
(1986); Barry & Brown, Differential Information and Security Market Equilibrium,
20 J. FIN. AND QUANTrTATIvE ANAL. 407 (1985).
5 This behavior includes diversifying one's portfolio in order to avoid risk.
Evans & Archer, Diversification and the Reduction of Dispersion: An Empirical
Analysis, 23 J. FINANCE 761 (1968) (investing in mutual funds and hedging with
index futures); Nordhauser, Using Stock Index Futures to Reduce Market Risk 10
J. OF PORTFOLIO MGMT. Spring 1984, at 56.
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ticated, and unmanaged investors are able to invest in securities. Even
if they are not knowledgeable in the dynamics driving the price of the
security they are buying or selling, the price is established by those who
are.56 The efficient market hypothesis has been at least implicitly accepted
by the courts.
5 7
This efficient market hypothesis pre-supposes that shares from the
same class of stock from the same corporation are equally fungible.58 If
a share that is part of a ten percent block of stock is more valuable than
a share that is part of a one percent block, the ability of the market to
efficiently value a generic share of stock is impaired. This state of affairs
could substantially compromise the orderly operation of financial mar-
kets.
A related concern is the welfare of minority shareholders without re-
gard to any contractual or voluntary fiduciary duties on the part of the
parties. This concern is reflected in the "insider trading" rules:59 The
"insider trading" rules are generally applied without regard to any fi-
duciary responsibility on the part of the insider to the non-insider; they
reflect a policy that small investors should be protected.60
16This observation explains the time-honored advice to non-professional inves-
tors: buy diversified securities, and never trade them unless you want to consume
the value.
17 Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1986) held that victims of insider
trading need not prove actual reliance on a misrepresentation or omission of fact,
but could rely on a "fraud on the market" theory. The court stated: "The fraud
on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed
securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the available
material information regarding the company and its business." Id. at 1160. See,
Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory 95 HAtv. L. REV. 1143, 1154-56 (1982)."
Accord, In re Phillips Petroleum Securities Litigation, 881 F.2d 1236, 1249-1250
(3d Cir. 1989).
58 An efficient market in which shares of the same class of stock were not
fungible could be imagined. In practice, however, it would be difficult to facilitate
the free flow of information necessary to keep the market equilibrium stable for
all buyers.
59 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990). See remarks of Rep. Rosenthal, 128 CONG. REc.
29021 (1982) ("People with inside information benefit to the detriment of innocent
people who lose money on these fixed situations. For every insider who profits,
another investor without inside information is the loser."
The problem of the precise fiduciary duty, if any, required to impose Rule
10b-5 liability has proved troublesome to the courts. In Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222 (1980), the court held that some breach of an existing fiduciary
relationship by an "insider" was a prerequisite to derivative "insider trading"
liability. This holding was amplified by Dirks v. Securities Exchange Commission,
463 U.S. 646 (1983). Although the concept of fiduciary responsibility plays a
critical role in the determination of Rule 10b-5 analysis, it is clear that the concept
is broader in the Rule 10b-5 analysis than in the common law analysis.
The requirement of fiduciary duty as a prerequisite for Rule lOb-5 liability has
been heavily criticized. See The Supreme Court, 1982 Term 97, HARV. L. REv. 1,
286-94 (1983).
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This goal of protecting small investors is a constant theme in the cor-
porate and securities laws.6 1 It is based upon the fact that small share-
holders have little ability to protect themselves in the securities markets.
The justification for the goal is therefore very similar to the justification
for the doctrine of unconscionability in contract.6 2 The weakness of the
corporate remedy when compared to the contractual remedy is that the
contractual remedy is not primarily concerned with the finding of "fault"
on the part of the stronger party,63 while the corporate remedy is.6
The nexus between the goal of protecting small shareholders and the
determination of insider wrongdoing seems tenuous at best. If the goal
of the corporate law is to protect the small shareholder from losses, it
would seem that the courts could use either the doctrine of unconscion-
ability or the doctrine of frustration of purpose65 to avoid the contract, or
a modification of these doctrines adopted to the corporate law area. The
application of both of these doctrines is more or less independent of wrong-
doing on the part of the party against whom the doctrine is sought to be
used.66
There are two major interrelated problems with the application of these
doctrines in the corporate law context: 1) The corporation, unlike the
contract, is deemed to be a permanent arrangement; and 2) neither the
doctrine of unconscionability nor the doctrine of frustration of purpose is
61 See remarks of Rep. LaGuardia, 75 CONG. REC. 8399 (1932): "So that the
American investor, on the representation made by the New York Stock Exchange,
thinking he was investing in something that was sound, now finds himself entirely
wiped out with bonds, the security and collateral for which have been entirely
removed."
See also a message from President Roosevelt, 78 CONG. XEc. 2264 (1934):
There remains the fact, however, that outside the field of legitimate in-
vestment naked speculation has been made far too alluring and far too easy
for those who could and for those who could not afford to gamble.
Such speculation has run the scale from the individual who has risked
his pay envelope or his meager savings on a margin transaction involving
stock with those whose true value he was wholly unfamiliar ...
62 See U.C.C. § 2-302; Jones v. Star Credit Co., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d
264 (1969); Eddy, On the "Essential" Purpose of Limited Remedies: The Meta-
physics of U.C.C. Section 2-219(2), 65 CAL. L. REv. 28, 40-58 (1977). Under the
unconscionability doctrine, a contract whose terms are grossly unfair ("uncon-
scionable") will not be enforced to the extent that it is unfair unless some reason
can be advanced why it should be enforced.
6Id.
6 "[The directors] may not act out of avarice, expediency, or self-interest in
derogation of their duty of loyalty to the other shareholders and to the corpora-
tion." Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 593, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515
(1975).
Krell v. Henry, 2 K.B. 740 (1903); Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal.2d 48, 153 P.2d
47 (1944).
Some of the early unconscionability cases seem to imply that the application
of the doctrine was based on the fact that there was a presumption that the
stronger party engaged in prohibited behavior. The modern trend is to deny
enforcement of egregiously one-sided contracts even when the stronger party can
show good faith dealing.
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designed to compensate a party to the contract for foreseeable occurrences
which affect the value of the contract. Both of these problems are the
result of the unique nature of stock ownership as an investment contract.
All of the investors in a corporation envision that their ownership
represents an investment in an ongoing enterprise. This vision is reflected
in accounting principles used to illustrate the condition of the corporation.
The principles are meant to reflect "the expectations a person has that
his decision about the use of certain resources will be effective." 67 If one
party is permitted to withdraw from the corporation, the expectations of
the investors will be substantially affected.
The application of the doctrine of frustration of purpose requires that
the occurrence which frustrates the purpose was not foreseeable by the
party claiming relief.68 It further requires that, in light of all the facts
and circumstances, public policy would be furthered by shifting the risk
of such occurrence from one party to the other.6 9 In this regard, application
of the doctrine could be viewed as essentially equitable in nature: The
party seeking relief must show that it would be "fair" to grant him (or
her) the relief.
The occurrence of a corporation "going private" is foreseeable, even if
the probability of any given company going private is considered remote.70
On the other hand, the decision of the corporation to go private is not
outside of the control of all of the parties to the corporate contract. If the
corporation were a simple bilateral contract between the majority share-
holder and the minority shareholder, a strong argument could be made
that the doctrine of frustration of purpose should be applied because it
would not be "unfair" to prejudice the rights of the majority shareholder. 71
In a more complex corporate situation, for example a corporation with a
large amount of debt, this argument would lose force because the rights
of "innocent" parties would also be prejudiced.72
67 Gamble, Property Rights and the Formulation of Accounting Statements, 1
(n.s.) J. ACCT. AUD. AND FIN. No. 2, 102 (1986) (quoting, Furubotn & Pejovich,
Property Rights and Economic Theory-Survey and Recent Literature, 63 J. ECON.
LIT. 1137, 1139 (1973).
153 P.2d at 50.
69 Id.
70 Some relief to shareholders that own stock in a corporation that is going
private may be afforded by the "tender offer" rules. See, Prentice, The Role of
States in Tender Offers: An Analysis of CTS, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1 (1988).
This relief is arguably more procedural than substantive.
71 This is apparently the rationale that the court was willing to adopt in Don-
ahue v. Rodd Electrotye Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
72 The holders of debt would be advancing an argument similar to the one that
was unsuccessful in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp.
1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The argument would in this case have more force because
the corporation (or the minority shareholders) could not argue that the debt
holders should have foreseen the elimination of part of the equity in this type of
transaction.
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The application of "fiduciary duties" as opposed to contractual duties
is limited by the corporate environment, in which both the person who
owes the fiduciary responsibility and the person who is the recipient of
the fiduciary responsibilities expect to maximize their profits. This is in
stark contrast to other areas in which a fiduciary responsibility has been
applied. In a trustee/beneficiary relationship, for example, the trustee is
expected to be a disinterested caretaker. 3 Any self-dealing will be subject
to strict scrutiny.7 4 In practice this additional scrutiny given self-dealing
transactions probably acts to restrain the consummation of economically
beneficial deals between the trust and the trustee.
75
A similar personal disinterest on the part of the party upon whom the
duty of fiduciary loyalty is placed is a hallmark of all traditional fiduciary
relationships. In the employee/employer relationship or principal/agent
relationship, the amount that the person owing the duty of loyalty can
benefit from the transaction is limited by the employment or agency
contract: the person has no direct interest in the outcome of the trans-
action.
Imposing the same standards of loyalty on a person who has an interest
in the transactions, such as a corporate insider, can result in placing the
insider in an untenable position. In the case of In re Hubbell's Will76 the
court placed a duty of fiduciary responsibility on a corporate officer who
was also the trustee of a testamentary trust. The court held that the duty
of fiduciary responsibility included responsibility for acts taken in his
personal capacity as a director/shareholder. 77 This imposition of fiduciary
responsibility had a substantial probability of creating a conflict between
the duties of the director/trustee and the rights of the director/share-
holder.
The court resolved this possible conflict in the following manner: "[f
an irreconcilable conflict between self-interest and fiduciary responsibil-
ity develops, the choice of the fiduciary is either to subordinate the former
or resign., 78 This mode of avoiding fiduciary responsibilities is not avail-
71 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
1, See, Munson v. Syracuse, Geneva & Coming R.R., 103 N.Y. 59, 8 N.E. 355,
358 (1886), which stated: "[The trustee] stood in the attitude of selling as owner
and purchasing as trustee. The law permits no one to act in such inconsistent
relations. It does not stop to inquire whether the contract or the transaction was
fair or unfair."
Most states probably would not follow the per se rule adopted in the above case,
but would place the burden on the trustee to prove that the transaction was fair.
In most states, the trustee's duty to refrain from self-dealing transactions cannot
be avoided contractually. See Comment, Directory Trusts and the Exculpatory
Clause, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 138, 140 (1965), and cases therein cited.
71 The risk to the trustee of failing to meet his (or her) burden of proof that
the transaction was mutually beneficial is great when the transaction becomes
uneconomical to the trust after the fact.
76 302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E.2d 888 (1951).
77 Id. at __, 97 N.E.2d at 891.
7 Id. at ,97 N.E.2d at 894.
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able to the director who is given fiduciary responsibilities because of his
position as director. Unless the legislatures or the courts are willing to
in effect mandate that all directors must be "outside" directors, and thus
forego the savings in agency costs resulting from interested directors,
conflicts of interest are unavoidable.
The goal of reducing the disparity in price between large blocks of
shares and smaller blocks of shares is an important justification for the
imposition of duties running from majority shareholders, directors, and
managers to minority shareholders. The imposition of the duty is, how-
ever, ill-suited to this purpose. The traditional contract remedies are
similarly ill-suited to this purpose. While the duty might prevent egre-
gious examples of corporate waste, it is doubtful that it protects in any
real manner the economic well-being of minority shareholders.
D. The Imposition of Inefficient Economic Behavior
on the Corporation
Recent economic literature has attempted to discern the effect of cen-
tralized stock ownership on the value of the corporation. One study in-
dicates that the value of a firm tends to rise as the centralized ownership
increases up to five percent; the value of a firm tends to decrease as the
centralized ownership increases from five percent to twenty-five percent;
the value of a firm again rises as the ownership increases over twenty-
five percent.79 This phenomenon has been explained in the following
terms:
A greater level of ownership concentration increases firm value
if the stockholder uses his votes to see that corporate resources
are managed more efficiently, or if the existence of the block
increases the probability of a value-increasing takeover.
Greater ownership concentration decreases firm value if the
block entrenches managers, insulating them from market dis-
cipline or reducing the possibility of a takeover.80
The value of common stock is in this view the reflection of the value of
the firm, any reallocation of "firm" assets from the common shareholders
reduces the value of the "firm".
79 Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, supra note 46, at 301. The increasing and de-
creasing values of the firm were tracked using the following formula:
The Firm's Market Value
Replacement Cost of its Physical Assets
This formula attempts to determine the value that the market places on the non-
tangible assets of the firm, including the ability and desire of the management
to compete with other firms in the marketplace. The important factor for the
terms of this paper is that the firm's market value is determined entirely by the
value of its common stock.
m Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration and Private Equity Sales, 23 J. OF
FrN. ECON. 3, 12 (1989).
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The "firm" however is not necessarily limited to the people who are
traditionally considered the owners of the firm.8' Commentators have
proposed the use of the term "coalition" to replace the term "firm". A
"coalition" is defined as a set of resource owners bound by contractual
relations. 82 This "coalition" would include employees, managers, bond-
holders, and other persons who are interested in the corporation but who
are not necessarily part of the traditional term "firm".
This expanded view of the definition of the firm would allow for a
broader calculation of its value. The firm would be more "efficient" if it
were able to generate more value for all persons with an interest in the
firm, from shareholders to the general public. Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny83 speculate that the value of the corporation increases because
the interests of management and shareholders converge. It is not clear
whether this increase in value is due to a real increase in efficiency or
merely a shift of returns from other persons with an interest (i.e. em-
ployees or the general public) to shareholders.
The determination of the total return to all interested persons in the
corporation is not susceptible of precise measurement. In this sense, the
use of the value of outstanding shares as a shorthand measurement of
the value of a corporation may reflect the unavailability of more general
information rather than theoretical limitations on the scope of the firm.
84
The measurement of firm efficiency in the general sense must be extrap-
olated from the known values of firm efficiency with regard to share-
holders.
It can be speculated with virtual certainty that the decline in value of
the corporation associated with the entrenchment of management is not
the result of a loss in efficiency (broadly defined), but a result of the
shifting of value from minority shareholders to majority shareholders/
management.8 5 The interests of management and shareholders would
continue to converge in the maximization of the overall value of the firm;
the divergence would occur in the proper allocation of the value between
shareholders and the minority shareholders' ability to enforce their will.
The management would only continue to divert corporate amenities to
the extent that the expected value of these amenities exceeds the expected
cost to the management. This equilibrium can be expressed in the fol-
lowing manner:
8' 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985).
82 Alchien & Woodward, The Firm is Dead; Long Live the Firm, 26 J. ECON.
LIT. 65) 76 (1988).
83 See Inre Hubbell's Will, 302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E.2d 888, 894 (1951); Morck,
Schleifer & Vishny, supra note 46, at 301.
In Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 46, at 301, the authors explain their
methodology of arriving at the value of the corporation. Implicit in their expla-
nation is that their method is imprecise, limited by the availability of published
information.
A possible caveat to this statement is the type of inefficiency imposed by the
imposition of a duty running from the corporation to minority shareholders. This
source of inefficiency will be discussed infra.
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(1) V' = C' K(R)
Where V' represents the expected value of the diverted amenities, C'
represents the expected cost of obtaining the amenities, and K(R) rep-
resents some constant reflecting the fact that very few managers are risk-
neutral (at some point they are going to opt for the less than optimal
choice merely because the risks associated with the other choice are too
great).
The expected cost of obtaining the amenities can be divided into three
categories. These three are the possible cost of losing an election and
being replaced, the possible cost of being the subject of a shareholder
derivative suit or suit for violation of fiduciary obligation, and the possible
cost of being criminally prosecuted for embezzlement. Because the prob-
ability of criminal prosecution is so low and is not really relevant to the
type of activity that is the subject of this article, we will ignore this factor.
The expected cost of obtaining the desired amenities can be expressed
in the following manner:
(2) C' = (PL)(CL) + (PE)(CE)
Where PL equals the probability of a lawsuit, CL equals the cost of a
lawsuit to management,86 PE equals the probability of losing an election
for directors and CE equals the cost to management of losing the election.
Ideally, the probability of a lawsuit and the probability of losing an
election for the board of directors would be a function of the extent to
which: 1) The directors and management have failed to maximize cor-
porate returns to the shareholders, and 2) the directors and management
have diverged from the shareholders' best interests to advance their own.
Analyzing the probability and cost of a lawsuit, we can ignore the failure
to maximize the corporation's returns since failure to do so is protected
in most cases by application of the business judgment rule."' Even in
those cases where the business judgment rule does not apply, the effect
of this type of activity because that failure to maximize corporate returns
is unaccompanied by any benefit to management, is rarely a conscious
decision.
The probability of a lawsuit and the cost of a lawsuit are directly related
to the extent to which the complaining shareholder is able to prove a
divergence between the management's actions and the shareholders' best
interests. Management which is seeking to avoid the costs of a lawsuit
will act in accordance with the following formula:
(3) T = V'- CL
AR
6 The cost of a lawsuit to management will not be the same as the cost of the
lawsuit to the corporation or the overall cost of the lawsuit. The corporation will
ordinarily bear what are generally thought of as the "costs" of the lawsuit (i.e.
legal expenses and the payment of any judgments). Nevertheless, the cost to
management can be significant in terms of adverse publicity, effect on future
actions, and expenditure of time.
17 See supra note 4.
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Where T is the transaction under consideration and AR represents the
ability of the corporation to re-characterize the transaction as one for the
corporation's own good (i.e. that there has been no divergence between
the management's interest and the shareholders' interest).
The ability to recharacterize the transaction as being in the best in-
terest of shareholders is in general terms a function of the returns to the
management as compared to the claimed returns to the shareholders. It
is this tension which creates incentive on the part of the management to
fail to optimize corporate efficiency. 8 The management desires to maxi-
mize its own returns, but can not except at the risk of harming its ability
to re-characterize the transaction as one in the corporation's own interest.
The management is only interested in maximizing the returns of the
corporation to the extent that this maximization is reflected in the man-
agement's own returns.
The end result of this tension is the "perk" (or perquisite), which is a
subset of the term amenity. The definition of the word "perk" is somewhat
nebulous. At least two definitions are possible. The first definition in-
cludes all non-salary transfers of wealth from the corporation to managers
that are traditionally treated as compensation, but perhaps not taxed as
such. 9 The transfers included in this definition are health benefits, pen-
sion plans, and paid vacations. Both management and shareholders are
aware that these transfers are compensation to the management.
The second type of perk, and the one that results in inefficiencies in
the corporate system, is the perk that arguably contains both a business
purpose and a benefit to management. This type of perk includes a myriad
of examples. It includes corporate travel for "business purposes", stock
option plans for "incentive purposes", 90 work conditions (such as luxurious
"Corporate efficiency" as used for purposes of this article is the ability of the
corporation to generate value for all members of the corporate coalition. To the
extent that value is maximized, the corporation is said to be more efficient.
89 I.R.C. § 89. This sort of behavior is justifiable if the United States government
is not considered part of the corporate coalition. A discussion of this point is
beyond the scope of the present work.
9 The stock option granted to insiders has, of course, utility to the insiders as
well as to the corporation. In Mason, Four Ways to Overpay Yourself Enough, 66
HARVARD Bus. REv. 69, 71 (1988), the author explained:
A familiar example of the KCR [Keep Compensation Rising] at work is the
underwater stock option. What better executive incentive than the stock
option for a corporation whose objective is to augment shareholder value?
The executive doesn't benefit unless the shareholder does. No tickee, no
washee, right? Wrong, says KCR. No tickee, we give you new tickee. Within
days after 1987's Black Monday stock market crash, the business press was
reporting that several major corporations planned to replace their execu-
tive's newly drowned options.
While disguised compensation in the form of stock options might be evidence of
excessive compensation, it does not increase corporate inefficiency. The perk is
ultimately paid in cash and not in some other commodity with less value to the
corporate coalition. See also Bohan, Measuring the Compensation Element in
Employee Stock Option Plans, 2 J. OF ACCT. AUD. AND FiN. 261 (1979).
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offices), executive education, and corporate charities.9 1 The dual purpose
of this type of perk simplifies the task of re-characterizing the benefits
received through it.
Under this mode of reasoning, the ability to find an unassailable busi-
ness purpose for these perks is much more important than the value to
be received by the management, as long as the value is greater than zero.
As long as there is an unassailable business purpose, the transaction will
have a zero probability of engendering litigation and under Formula 3,
proposed earlier, management will enter into the transaction. In order
to have an unassailable business purpose, the transaction should have a
positive marginal utility. Courts have given great deference to mana-
gerial decision-making in this area. It would be very difficult to determine
whether the renovation of a corporate headquarters, for instance, would
have a positive marginal utility.
In light of this theoretical momentum towards entering into transac-
tions which contain both returns to the corporation and returns to the
management, one would expect some type of empirical validation. The
empirical validation might be limited by the natural reluctance of cor-
porate officials to disclose such transactions. The facts brought to light
in two recent hostile takeovers perhaps shed some light on the extent of
this activity.
The New York Times9 2 contained an article that described the perks
available to the executives of the J. Walter Thompson Co. prior to its
takeover. This article revealed that the advertising agency spent
$4,000,000 a year keeping up the two executive floors in its headquarters.
It further revealed that the company spent $80,000 a year providing one
executive with a single peeled orange every day. The article also revealed
that Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. spent $25,000,000 on a lodge in Bea-
ver Creek, Colorado and that Time-Warner, Inc. owns a luxury house in
Acapulco used mostly by corporate executives.
In the best seller Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco,93
the authors outline the activities of Ross Johnson. These activities include
the maintenance of a large private aircraft fleet and the habit of flying
his dog with him around the country in a separate aircraft.
"I In A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953)
the court held that a gift to Princeton University served a useful corporate end,
that it did not constitute a distribution to the executive who favored the distri-
bution, and that the gift was a legal exercise of the corporate power. Would the
result in this case have been different if the plaintiff could have shown that the
executive was an alumnus of Princeton, that he sat on the board of trustees of
Princeton, and that Princeton had voted him an award for corporate charity?
Obviously at some point the "corporate" charitable acts begin to have substantial
personal benefit to the executive.
92N. Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1990, § 3 at 29, col. 1.
93 B. BURROUGH & J. HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR
NABisco (1990).
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Perhaps more reflective of the tension between the personal return to
the management and the objective of maximizing shareholder wealth is
the growing investment by corporations in art.9 4 This art has an element
of personal return to corporate management/executives: They like to be
around nice things. Arguably, the purchase and display of the art max-
imizes shareholder returns: Art has been a good investment traditionally
and it can be used by the corporation to increase employee morale. It is
difficult to separate the elements of investment for the sake of share-
holders and investment for the sake of the management.
These incidences are not advanced in this article as examples of cor-
porate "greed" or "abuse": They are advanced as examples by corporate
managers of failing to maximize corporate efficiency. The most ardent
supporters of high executive compensation would not argue that Ross
Johnson would have flown his dog around the country, or that the man-
agement of J. Walter Thompson Co. would have spent $80,000 a year for
an orange a day if they had been spending their own money. By spending
the corporation's money in such a manner they not only fail to maximize
the returns to the shareholders, they fail to maximize the returns to the
entire corporate coalition.
This result is troublesome both from a theoretical and societal per-
spective. Under Coase's theorem, parties to a contract normally will reach
an agreement that maximizes production to the unit as a whole.95 This
mechanism is apparently not operating in the case of corporate perks. A
commentator has theorized that the free exchange of information is a
necessary prerequisite to the operation of the theorem.9 In the case of
public companies, this prerequisite is not met because management has
no duty to disclose behavior which they contend is in the shareholders'
best interest and only tangentially in their own.
In the closely held corporation,'9 7 the failure to disclose information is
not the critical driving force behind the failure to maximize the efficiency
of the corporation. The driving force stems from the relative, but not
absolute, failure of minority shareholders to obtain redress for their griev-
ances. A requirement that the management reveal corporate "perks"
would mitigate the potential for abuse in the publically-owned corpora-
tions; in order to mitigate the potential for abuse in privately-held cor-
porations, the process by which minority rights are vindicated would have
to be totally overhauled.
94 N. Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1989, § 3, at 13, col. 1; Cassullo, The Fine Art of
Corporate Collecting, 66 HARV. Bus. REV. 137 (1988).
95 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. OF L. AND ECON. 1, 8 (1960).
Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem, 1 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 113 (1987).
91 For this purpose, a closely held corporation is a corporation where there is
a substantial unity of interests between a group of shareholders who are able to
maintain control of the corporation and the management. This definition is some-
what broader than the traditional definition which includes both centralized
shareholder control and the lack of a market for the shares. Galler v. Galler, 32
Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964).
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While the press has revealed disparagingly the excesses of corporate
America, 98 it has failed to consider that these excesses are the rationale
if cynical, response to the application of corporate law. A point worth
noting is that these corporations are publicly held and the threat of share-
holder disapproval at the shareholders' meetings, however remote, is at
least a possibility.99 In a privately-held corporation the momentum toward
disguising compensation as expenditures for the independent good of the
corporation would be even greater.
E. The Costs Imposed Upon Society to Litigate Claims
of Insider Wrongdoing
The courts have been given two models to review actions by corporate
insiders to the detriment of minority shareholders. The first is the def-
erential, or traditional corporate, model; 0 the second is the strict review,
or trust, model.'0' As has been explained in this article, the courts and
legislatures have chosen a deferential approach to review corporate man-
agement's behavior in dealing with minority shareholders.10 2 In part, this
decision is possibly the result of the courts' unwillingness to imply any
form of fiduciary responsibility on corporate insiders.
An additional reason for the implication of a deferential as imposed to
a strict review of the actions of corporate insiders is that the corporate
environment continually places insiders in a position where fiduciary
requirements in a strict sense could not possibly be met.10 3 The deferential
model of review of the actions of insiders has been adopted because it is
workable compared to the strict review (or trust) model and not because
of any intrinsic value in the concept.
A third alternative open to the courts and the legislatures is the adop-
tion of an intermediate standard for review of corporate transactions. An
intermediate standard could vindicate the claims of minority sharehold-
ers without placing the insiders in the position of violating their fiduciary
responsibilities in every situation. The standard could be flexible enough
to effectively prohibit forms of diversion which only facially have a valid
corporate purpose.
91 Greenwald, Bashing Greed for Fun and Profit, TIME, February 19, 1990, at
71.
" See E. ARONOW & H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL(1968); Bartlett, Life in the Executive Suite After Drexel, N.Y. Times Feb. 18, 1990,
§ 3, at 1, col. 2, which argues that since hostile takeovers will be less likely to
occur, management will be less likely to be responsive to the needs of shareholders.
100 See supra note 4.
101 See supra note 12.
102 See Mercantile Trading Co. v. Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 325, 154
A. 457, 461 (1931).
1'3 See In re Hubbel's Will, 302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E.2d 888, 894 (1951).
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The courts have at times applied an intermediate standard of scrutiny
of the actions of corporate insiders. In Smith v. Van Gorkom,0 4 the Del-
aware Supreme Court stated that the standard to be used to judge insiders'
actions is whether the actions constituted "gross negligence". °5 This in-
termediate standard, designed to prohibit careless acts, is easily avoided
ex ante and is taken into consideration by insiders while corporate action
is being considered. 10 6
The flexibility of this standard, which is its greatest strength, is also
its greatest weakness. Many corporate transactions could become the
subject of debate and could result in litigation.10 7 The threat of litigation
could prevent the execution of many economically beneficial transactions.
As a policy matter, it is not clear that the benefits from the imposition
of this sort of duty would outweigh the negative results.
V. CONCLUSION
The imposition of the duty running from majority shareholders, direc-
tors, and managers to minority shareholders is inefficient in that it places
upon corporate insiders the perverse incentive of failing to maximize
returns to the corporate coalition. The most obvious alternative, giving
absolute free rein to corporate insiders, is distasteful. It violates one's
sense of equity to allow powerful interests to use their power to abridge
the rights of weaker parties.
The issue is no longer whether minority shareholders should be pro-
tected, but whether they can be efficiently protected and in what manner.
Because the examination centers on existing institutions rather than
theoretical markets, it is possible that we have reached the limits of legal
economic theory in trying to examine the issues involved in this article.10
Economic theory is not particularly helpful in determining the proper
allocation of resources; it is perhaps more helpful in determining the
manner in which the allocation should be accomplished. Because at the
most fundamental level the issues addressed in this article involve the
104 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
105 Id., at 873 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. Super Ct. 1984)).
The standard has been restated as one of using "unintelligent and unadvised
judgment", Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass Co., 19 Del. Ch. 326, 167 A. 831,
833 (1933), and "without the bounds of reason and recklessly". Gimbel v. Signal
Companies, Inc., 316 A.2d 599,615 (Del.Ch. 1974), affd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1974).
106 See supra at note 88.
"07 Of course, this argument could be made against the promulgation of any
law. In the corporate area this argument is more compelling because economic
efficiency is the purpose for the creation of corporations.
108 See Note, Economic Analysis in the Courts: Limits and Restraints, 64 IND.
L. J. 769 (1989), arguing that economic theory is too nebulous and susceptible to
manipulation to be used by the courts in a wholesale manner.
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allocation of resources between majority and minority shareholders, the
economic issues might be peripherally relevant rather than centrally
relevant. 109
Even if economic analysis is not the acid test to determine whether a
rule has positive utility for society, when economic efficiency and per-
ceived fairness are strongly negatively correlated, the set of rules should
be questioned and alternatives explored. The rule imposing fiduciary
duties running from majority shareholders, directors, and managers to
minority shareholders can not be viewed in a vacuum; it is part of the
"seamless web" of corporate law. The inefficiencies may be the unavoid-
able result of other positive features of corporate law. To the extent that
the inefficiencies are avoidable, alternatives should be explored, and if
superior adopted. To the extent that the inefficiencies are unavoidable,
the markets will presumably react to the known inefficiencies.
o In A. BLINDER, HARD HEADS, SOFT HEARTS: TOUGH-MINDED ECONOMICS FOR
A JUST SOCIETY (1987), the author argues that a balance must be struck between
the dual issues of whether the transaction is efficient and whether the transaction
is fair. See also Johnson, Book Review, 67 TEx. L. REv. 659, 664 (1989).
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